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Abstract 
We investigate security of ADS-B system and 
propose a framework composed of two solutions that 
would require minimal change to the existing system. 
The investigation focuses on providing an encrypted 
ADS-B system that provides confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity while requiring minimal 
changes to the existing ADS-B specification. The 
proposed framework consisting of two solutions is 
envisioned to be implemented through software 
updates while providing backwards compatibility. The 
most challenging requirement during this study was to 
work within the constraints of the existing ADS-B 
system. 
1. Introduction and Contributions 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B) is planned to be one of the pillars of the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). 
ADS-B lacks some capabilities that are essential for 
addressing cybersecurity concerns. The missing 
properties are source and content authentication, 
confidentiality, as well as integrity. The reported work 
has usually addressed some of these shortcomings 
without much consideration of others. This creates 
room for improvement: addressing these shortcomings 
collectively and this is where our work becomes 
relevant.  
The primary goal of this effort has been to 
investigate ADS-B security and identify ways in which 
the issue of anonymity could be effectively addressed in 
the NextGen National Airspace System (NAS). In 
addition, we tried to determine whether we could devise 
a solution for offering an encrypted ADS-B system. 
Such a solution would ideally provide participants 
additional confidentiality and privacy, as well as some 
degree of message freshness and integrity. 
The proposed security framework is envisioned to 
require minimal change to the ADS-B specification. 
The proposed solution is such that the system will 
maintain full backwards-compatibility with existing 
aircraft transponders and would require only software 
updates. Backwards compatibility would enable phased 
introduction of any solution in case of adoption.  
The goal of this paper is not to focus on active 
attacks (many researchers have already covered those as 
seen in Section 2). This work focuses on addressing 
passive attacks to enhance privacy and selective 
anonymity against real-time tracking. If the proposed 
approach in this paper were to see wide adoption, it 
could also help mitigate various active attacks such as 
not being able to generate valid broadcasts. 
2. Background 
2.1. ADS-B Overview 
ADS-B is the technology that has been heralded by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other 
civil aviation authorities as central to modernizing the 
state of airspace management across the globe [9]. It 
was chosen in 2005 [9] under the NextGen Air 
Transportation System and Single European Sky 
programs to improve the accuracy of radar-based traffic 
information used by air traffic controllers [22]. Until 
recently, controllers have relied on secondary 
surveillance radar (SSR) to improve the accuracy of 
aircraft identification and tracking. SSR has gone 
through a series of evolutions over time, as indicated by 
the specific mode supported by a transponder [8]. 
Growing airspace congestion has necessitated 
improvements in the types of data collected, the 
accuracy of that data, and the determination of data 
measurement error [30]. ADS-B intends to improve on 
its SSR predecessors in distinct ways [30]: 
1. It is automatic, in the sense that no controller or 
pilot action is required to transmit aircraft 
information to nearby receivers. 
2. It is dependent surveillance, in that the accuracy of 
transmitted information is dependent on the 
existence of adequate navigational information 
onboard the aircraft (e.g. GPS). 
3. It is a one-way broadcast in nature, in the sense that 
aircraft information is transmitted without a priori 
knowledge of who will actually receive it. 
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ADS-B provides information not only about aircraft 
position and altitude as before, but also with regard to 
the identity, velocity, and intent of an aircraft [30]. This 
data is transmitted in plaintext, and is made available to 
all equipped ground- and air-based participants in an 
effort to address airspace congestion concerns, increase 
airspace coverage areas, and effectively deal with flight 
safety by providing pilots with access to the same 
information as controllers [10]. While already mandated 
in some other countries, aircraft within the US will not 
be required to adopt ADS-B until 2020 for those flights 
operating in or around Class A, B, C, and some E 
airspaces [3]. 
ADS-B has been approved for operation on two 
separate data links: 978MHz and 1090MHz. The former 
is referred to as Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), 
and is intended predominantly for use by general 
aviation operators. The latter, on the other hand, is 
generally referred to as Extended Squitter Mode S 
(1090ES), and is intended predominantly for use by 
commercial aviation operators. These distinctions 
reflect existing regulations already in place within the 
U.S., as well as those that the FAA has proposed for 
ADS-B equipage requirements in 2020 [3]. 
ADS-B services can then be further categorized into 
ADS-B In and ADS-B Out. ADS-B Out consists of all 
functionality pertaining to the automatic broadcast of 
aircraft parameters by participants, while ADS-B In 
consists of all functionality pertaining to the receipt, 
processing, and presentation of this information to 
pilots and controllers [2]. Aircraft within the U.S. will 
only be required to equip for ADS-B Out [3]; however, 
the maximum benefit can be extracted from the system 
through the combined use of both components to gain 
better situational awareness for pilots. 
While ADS-B data links exist on separate 
frequencies, probably the most significant difference 
between them is the length of messages available to 
broadcast the same types of information to nearby 
aircraft. For the 1090ES data link, messages are only 14 
bytes long [31], while UAT messages can be anywhere 
from 18-34 bytes long depending on the payload type 
[32]. The UAT link not only provides additional 
capacity to that of the already-congested 1090ES 
frequency, but also the bandwidth to offer ground-to-air 
services [2]. 
Table 1 shows the standard message format for the 
1090ES data link. Since the 1090MHz frequency is 
shared with all other legacy SSR systems, an ADS-B 
message begins with the declaration of the ADS-B 
downlink format number (17). It is then followed by a 
description of the Mode S transponder (CA), the 
transponder’s 24-bit ICAO address (AA), message 
parameters (ME), and parity check bits (PI) [31]. The 
limited space available to the ME field requires that 
aircraft broadcast several types of ADS-B messages at 
varying frequencies to ensure that all required 
information is transmitted. As stated by DO-260B, the 
“maximum ADS-B message transmission rate [for an 
aircraft] shall not exceed 6.2 transmitted messages per 
second” [31]. These message types include [31]: 
1. Airborne Position 
2. Surface Position 
3. Aircraft Identification and Category 
4. Airborne Velocity 
5. Aircraft Status (e.g. TCAS, emergency, priority) 
6. Target State and Status 
7. Aircraft Operational Status 
Table 1. 1090ES ADS-B Message format [8] 
Bit # 1–5 6–8 9–32 33–88 89–112 
Field 
|Size| 
DF=17 
|5| 
CA 
|3| 
AA 
|24| 
ME 
|56| 
PI 
|24| 
 
By allowing for variable message lengths, UAT 
participants can reduce the number of messages 
broadcast, while still transmitting the same types of 
information as on 1090ES. A breakdown of the 
standard message format and individual message fields 
for UAT will not be discussed here, and we direct the 
reader to consult [32] for additional information. 
In order to bridge the communication barrier 
between the two ADS-B data links, the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) 
service takes the information from each frequency and 
retransmits it on the other [2]. This allows each aircraft 
participant to not only see the aircraft that share the 
same data link, but also those that use the other one. 
The FAA also operates two other services at this time 
[2], the details of which are outlined extensively in 
[11]: 
1. Flight Information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B): 
provides UAT-equipped aircraft with weather (text 
and graphics), NOTAMs, and ATIS [30]. 
2. Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B): 
provides all aircraft with information on the 
approximate position, velocity, and altitude of 
traffic that are not equipped with ADS-B 
compatible transponders. 
2.2. Previous ADS-B Security Analyses 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
(GAMA) stated the following in its report: 
“General aviation operators are concerned about 
potential privacy and security implications resulting 
from equipping their aircraft with ADS-B. … The core 
concern of the operator community is real-time 
tracking of the geographic location of a specific 
aircraft” [24]. 
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In response to this and other similar concerns, the 
FAA working group issued the following remark: 
“[We have] determined that equipping aircraft with 
ADS-B does not materially change the ability to track 
aircraft, because aircraft that currently operate with a 
Mode S transponder already transmit their ICAO 24-bit 
code” [3]. 
The working group was correct to point out that 
Mode S has already been broadcasting an aircraft’s 
ICAO code for decades [33]. However, we believe the 
increased availability of technology and its impact on 
the privacy and security of this system requires further 
consideration. For example, it is trivial to lookup the 
ICAO code for a specific aircraft [12] online and even 
download the entire US aircraft registry [13]. Similarly, 
the decreasing cost of radio electronics has allowed 
websites such as FlightAware [19] and FlightRadar24 
[20] to amass online tracking data by relying on a 
community of enthusiasts to set up their own ADS-B 
receivers and upload the information in real-time. 
The plaintext nature of ADS-B lends itself to attacks 
of two kinds: passive and active. Passive attacks 
generally “rely on the knowledge derived by 
eavesdropping on ADS-B messages” [37]. For instance, 
long-term data collection in a given area might allow 
someone to come up with statistical models about 
destinations, delays, or fleets for not only their own 
business activities, but also to learn about those 
belonging to their competitors [37, 34]. These 
researchers in [37] even discovered that with a single, 
low-cost receiver, they could receive messages from up 
to 450km away and track aircraft on average for 10 
minutes. Similarly, research in [39] describes a range of 
attacks against ADS-B system. The researchers in [21] 
present threat scenarios against NextGen ATC 
including the ADS-B concerns. 
On the other hand, active attacks can “result in 
severe threats to air traffic safety, including attacks on 
air traffic monitors and automated assisting systems like 
traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) and pilots” 
[37]. Generally speaking, most research in the area 
seems to agree that these types of attacks can be 
categorized as [35]: 
1. Disruption of GPS readings 
2. Wireless jamming of surveillance-related 
communications 
3. Manipulation of ADS-B transmissions [28, 40] 
a. Message Injection (target ghost injection, 
flooding) 
b. Message Deletion (aircraft obfuscation) 
c. Message Modification (trajectory 
modification, aircraft impersonation) 
Air traffic controllers are oftentimes able to utilize 
techniques such as multilateration [35] or even fuzzy 
mathematics in data fusion algorithms [16] to protect 
against most attacks that manipulate ADS-B 
communications. However, the mobile nature of an 
ADS-B network between any set of aircraft makes these 
approaches irrelevant when it comes to verifying data 
received by a single aircraft. It is here where security 
efforts need to focus, developing solutions that are not 
only quick and resource-efficient, but that can also deal 
with aircraft interactions that may only ever last several 
seconds [35]. 
Simple techniques like authentication, encryption, 
and hashing would be able to mitigate a lot of the issues 
facing ADS-B at this time; however, the consensus is 
that the “key distribution and management involved in 
[such] solutions would overwhelm the aviation 
industry” [28], and the message size constraints of the 
data links make most popular solutions to these 
problems undesirable or even infeasible [40]. 
2.2.1. ADS-B Message Encryption and Integrity 
It remains a difficult problem to implement 
solutions that would validate and protect message 
contents without making changes to the data link 
specification. Limited bandwidth and message size are 
often the reason the research in this area is small, 
particularly with respect to 1090ES [40]. Most hashing 
algorithms for message integrity require space that does 
not exist in a message, while the key distribution 
problem on a congested, dynamic channel and the non-
standard ADS-B message length is crippling for the 
purposes of encryption [1]. A proposal has been put 
forward by United Airlines to utilize 8 Phase-Shift 
Keying to expand the bandwidth of the ADS-B data 
link to alleviate some of these issues; however, any 
such changes are not expected for adoption anytime in 
the immediate future [24]. 
Given the constraints of the ADS-B system, the 
consensus amongst researchers is that symmetric block 
algorithms are the best choice when it comes to 
encryption [1]. In order to employ an “open” ADS-B 
network with asymmetric encryption, aircraft would 
have to be able to identify their neighbors, somehow 
obtain the necessary public keys, and then transmit a 
message several times encrypted with the public key for 
each neighboring aircraft [17]. This process would 
severely reduce the rate of information flow between 
aircraft on the same ADS-B data link [17]. On the other 
hand, use of symmetric encryption would be faster if 
every aircraft knew the shared encryption key for a 
given area [17]. 
The majority of solutions proposed for ADS-B 
suggest use of encryption for ensuring message 
integrity. Researchers proposed provisioning secret 
encryption keys for each aircraft [1, 25, 36]. These 
research efforts offer little value to ADS-B airborne 
participants for message verification, and further 
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emphasize the need for new approaches that allow all 
participants to check transmissions before processing. 
A solution proposed for message integrity in [25] 
was that for a series of six consecutive messages, a 
hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) of 
128 bits be determined and split across these messages 
within the PI field. Another solution to integrity 
included retroactive key publication through the 
μTESLA authentication protocol, which sends an 
encrypted message authentication code (MAC) with 
each transmission. The key used to generate these 
MACs is then periodically transmitted to all neighbors, 
which can then be used to decrypt them and verify that 
the message source has been constant over the past time 
interval(s) [40]. In both of these cases and in [36], 
supporting message integrity, changes to the ADS-B 
specification would have been required. Even if this 
were not the case, the assumption that no messages 
would be lost during transmission is not realistic. The 
likelihood of message collision on ADS-B data links 
quickly increases with higher traffic densities [40].  
2.2.2. Other Privacy Proposals 
Aside from some of these more technically oriented 
solutions to security and privacy concerns with ADS-B, 
GAMA also proposed a number of alternatives that 
could be utilized in the short-term [24]: 
1. Private FAA Aircraft Registry: Making parts 
or all of the aircraft registry private would make it 
difficult to associate an aircraft to its owner. The 
problem is that the existing registry can be downloaded 
[13]. In addition, there are legal commitments imposed 
by the Freedom of Information Act exemptions and the 
Cape Town Convention (which established the 
International Aircraft Registry) [24]. 
2. Anonymity Mode for 1090ES: UAT provides 
an anonymity mode that can be utilized by pilots who 
operate under visual flight conditions and do not wish 
to utilize ATC services [15]. However, the 1090ES data 
link does not provide such a feature. Presumably, this is 
due to the fact that the target users of this link (e.g. 
commercial operators) require the use of ATC services 
during normal operations [24]. 
3. Aircraft Registry Privacy Office: aircraft 
ICAO codes are publicly available online and can be 
mathematically computed solely from the knowledge of 
a tail number. Much as in the manner that military 
aircraft can be issued arbitrary ICAO codes by a 
Department of Defense office, GAMA has proposed 
that the FAA provide a system by which operators 
could request the dynamic assignment of ICAO codes 
at will from a designated pool of reserved addresses 
[24]. 
There are valid concerns in [34, 15] that there needs 
to be a way in which any arbitrary ICAO code can still 
be traced back to a specific aircraft. For instance, ATC 
services can only be administered to aircraft whose 
identity is known, while search and rescue efforts could 
be significantly hindered if nothing is known about the 
aircraft itself [15]. Also, if ICAO codes are self-
assigned as performed in the UAT anonymity mode, 
there is no longer a guarantee that these codes will be 
unique among aircraft [34]. A solution is needed that 
hides the identity of an aircraft operator from everyone 
except those organizations that are legally entitled to 
that information (e.g. FAA, government agencies). 
2.3. Related Concepts 
In order to properly understand some aspects of the 
framework presented in this paper, the reader will find 
it helpful to be familiar with some related concepts. 
Due to space constraints in this paper, we will refrain 
from going into too much detail; however, we urge the 
reader to consult the following resources for 
information on these topics: 
1. Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications 
System (AeroMACS): [5, 23, 26, 27, 29] 
2. Resurrecting Duckling Paradigm: [38] 
3. ADS-B Privacy Framework Proposal 
3.1. Goals 
At his Blackhat presentation in 2012, Andrei Costin 
of the Institut Eurécom described the ADS-B protocol 
as “all R/W with ‘Guest as Admin’ enabled” [6]. In 
addition to highlighting many of the issues already 
discussed in Section 2, he identified what he termed the 
dominant threats to the ADS-B system [6]: 
1. Entity / Message Authentication 
2. Entity Authorization (e.g. medium access) 
3. Entity Temporary Identifiers / Privacy 
4. Message Integrity (HMAC) 
5. Message Freshness (non-replay) 
6. Encryption (message secrecy) 
Few efforts have simultaneously addressed most or 
all of these issues. Usually when a solution is proposed 
for an issue, it conflicts with some other issue on this 
list. Therefore, the primary goal for this work was to 
investigate the solutions already proposed for ADS-B 
security and adapt them into a form that is more widely 
functional and deployable into existing ADS-B rollouts. 
A secondary goal was to determine whether an effective 
solution could be prescribed for offering an encrypted 
ADS-B system in the short term.  
A self-imposed constraint on our research direction 
was to develop a security framework that would require 
minimal change to the ADS-B specification. In this 
way, the proposed solution would maintain full 
backwards-compatibility with existing aircraft 
transponders and would require only software updates. 
This also means that these changes, if adopted, could be 
gradually phased into service across the nation and be 
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simultaneously administered with any existing 
infrastructure and protocols. 
3.2. Anonymity 
The fragmentation of ADS-B support across two 
data links has introduced a fundamental discrepancy in 
the length of messages supported by any ADS-B 
participant. For UAT, message payloads can vary in 
length from anywhere between 18 and 34 bytes [32], 
while 1090ES message payloads can only be 7 bytes 
(ignoring the space allocated for aircraft identity) [31]. 
Despite this, message source identity is established as a 
single 24-bit address in both ADS-B links. Typically, 
this value is the ICAO code for an aircraft. There are 
two factors that need to be kept in mind: 
1. While not all UAT participants broadcast their tail 
number in message transmissions, 1090ES 
participants always do [31]. The plaintext nature of 
ADS-B broadcasts allows an attacker to decode 
and positively correlate a specific tail number to an 
ICAO transponder ID. 
2. Even if ADS-B messages didn’t transmit an aircraft 
tail number, the FAA provides public online and 
offline access to the US aircraft registry that 
contains all ICAO codes [12, 13]. This means that 
attackers can directly look up, or reverse-look up 
an aircraft from an ICAO code. 
While anonymity is not a requirement for 
commercial airlines, those in general and corporate 
aviation tend to be more sensitive to lack of privacy. 
Such information could be very easily exploited via 
corporate espionage schemes that mine historical and 
live data for any trend that indicates the types of 
activities a competitor might be undertaking [34, 37]. 
So while there is more pressing demand for a resolution 
in the 1090ES link, any solution to this problem should 
be directly applied to UAT as well. 
The UAT specification already provides a 
mechanism for pilots to achieve a form of pseudo-
anonymity. As per DO-282B, there are two methods of 
achieving this [32]: 
1. For those aircraft with an available aircraft ICAO 
code, a temporary identifier can be generated by 
XOR’ing the permanent aircraft code with the 
concatenated least significant 12-bits of the 
aircraft’s latitude and longitude at the time this 
operation is selected. 
2. For those aircraft without an available aircraft 
ICAO code, the time of day is used in place of the 
aircraft ICAO code for the operation performed in 
Method 1. 
There are a couple of issues with this proposed 
mechanism for UAT anonymity. The first issue is that 
there is no guarantee that an anonymous aircraft code is 
unique. A self-assigned temporary aircraft code could 
collide with that of another aircraft. The second 
problem is aircraft tend to either operate with fairly 
predictable travel patterns or are based at a specific 
airport(s). This means that both approaches to 
determining a temporary address in UAT can be brute-
forced by an attacker. 
 
The general consensus in the private sector seems to 
be that the FAA should allocate a pool of aircraft codes 
that can be randomly allocated when anonymity is 
needed [24]. However, there has been no effective 
provisioning policy discussed for how the FAA should 
address the following issues in the context of 
anonymous IDs: 
1. Establishing the identity of the originator for an 
anonymous aircraft code request. 
2. The duration for which the anonymous aircraft code 
is valid. 
3. Mechanisms for ATC to resolve an anonymous 
flight to a real aircraft registration. 
 
The process of identity establishment can include: 
1. The pairing of the aircraft with a personal device or 
electronic flight bag that is capable of connecting 
to FAA systems via cellular, Wi-Fi, satellite, 
AeroMACS, or CPDLC networks. The aircraft 
should “imprint” on the device (using resurrecting 
duckling paradigm), such that it will only ever 
respond to interactions with this device [38]. Since 
it is the communications gateway for all privacy 
requests to the FAA, it must be onboard the aircraft 
whenever in use. 
2. The generation of a private-public key pair for the 
aircraft, of which the private key is stored onboard 
the aircraft and the public key is stored in a private 
FAA database. This establishes a trusted aircraft 
identity that can be used when handling requests 
for anonymous IDs or key schedules. 
3. The generation of a binary ‘case mask’ for the 
aircraft, which is stored in a private FAA database 
and onboard the aircraft. 
The assumption is that the FAA and its designated 
agents can be trusted to perform the association process 
stated in item 1 with the strictest of standards and 
integrity. It is also assumed that in case imprinting or 
the imprinted device fails, the aircraft can switch to its 
actual ICAO code. Optionally, the establishment of a 
power-on password would ensure that no cockpit 
equipment can be initialized unless the credential holder 
or trusted individual is present. 
A secure connection needs to be established 
between the aircraft pilot and FAA systems to enable 
the identity establishment process to take place. We 
assume that any request shall be processed after engine 
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startup and cockpit equipment initialization, but before 
the transponder is activated. We believe that this 
process could be handled automatically by the onboard 
aircraft systems, if the pilot sets some default 
configuration to anonymous and/or encrypted mode. 
The process of requesting an anonymous aircraft 
code from the FAA might look something like the 
following from the perspective of an aircraft: 
1. Upon selection of anonymous mode, the aircraft 
establishes a secure connection to the FAA over its 
IP-enabled communication link. 
2. The aircraft transmits an encrypted (symmetric) 
payload encrypted signed with its private key. The 
payload consists of:  
a. Actual aircraft tail number and ICAO aircraft 
code. 
b. ADS-B type (UAT or 1090ES), as this is 
needed to determine the length of the 
symmetric key required to obfuscate the true 
aircraft identity in all messages. 
c. A “registrant string”, consisting of the publicly-
available owner and address from the FAA 
aircraft registration record XOR’ed with the 
aircraft’s case mask. 
d. Estimated flight time to next full-stop 
destination. 
3. If this payload is properly decrypted and validated 
against known aircraft records, the FAA will 
provision an anonymous aircraft code and 
symmetric key to the requesting aircraft. 
4. The aircraft receives the temporary aircraft code, an 
expiry time, and an encryption key. It then instructs 
the transponder to activate with the provided 
aircraft code, and use the encryption key to hide 
the message type (1090ES) or message field 
(UAT) that contains aircraft identification 
information. 
Upon full-stop arrival at the intended destination 
and once the aircraft is parked, the onboard systems 
shall disable the transponder and inform the FAA that 
the temporary aircraft code can be released back into 
the pool. If the code expires before the aircraft makes it 
to the destination, the FAA shall automatically release it 
back to the available pool and the aircraft will 
reconfigure the transponder to use the aircraft ICAO 
code for the remainder of the flight. Any onboard 
TCAS systems should use the temporary aircraft code 
when available, but the Emergency Locator Transmitter 
(ELT) system should always use the aircraft ICAO code 
since it is intended only for operation during an 
emergency. 
To clarify what exactly constitutes the registrant 
string, let us assume that we are using the aircraft with 
tail number N106ER to request an anonymous ID. The 
registration information can be retrieved online at [12]. 
The case mask shall be 146-bits in length. This is 
determined by the maximum space permitted for each 
of the registration fields used in assembling this 
registrant string, as indicated in documentation 
available at [13].  This concept of the case mask 
borrows from DNS forgery resilience research [7] to 
establish reasonable assurances that communication is 
occurring between the intended parties, particularly 
when that interaction is predicated on easily accessible, 
public information. 
For this example, let us assume that the case mask 
assigned at aircraft delivery was: 
010110101111101100010001010010110010011011
001000101011010100111001011001100011111111
000101111111100001011011011001100111001110
01111010001111110101 
First, we must generate the string that will be used 
in the XOR operation with the case mask. As shown 
below, it consists of the comma-separated 
concatenation of the registrant’s name, street, city, state, 
and zip code. The end of the record is indicated by a 
period, and padded with any character to achieve a 
string of the maximum record length to assist in 
preventing brute-force attacks on particularly short 
aircraft records. Here, we only use the letter ‘a’ for 
simplicity. 
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL 
UNIVERSITY,600 S CLYDE MORRIS 
BLVD,DAYTONA 
BEACH,FL,32114.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
Then if we XOR the string above (x) with the case 
mask (c) as in x⊕ c, we will get the final registrant 
string that is transmitted along with the official request 
to the FAA. This XOR operation permutes the case of 
each letter in the string (e.g. a⊕ 0=a, a⊕ 1=A). While 
the researchers in [7] didn’t account for manipulation of 
numbers or symbols in their paper, rules could easily be 
defined for these characters to further validate that the 
correct case mask is being used (e.g. x⊕ 0=x, x⊕ 
1=(x+1) mod 10 for numbers). 
Note that the field delimiters imposed on the 
registrant string are not part of this XOR operation, and 
we assume that we are using nonprescribed XOR rules 
for numbers and punctuation for the final output: 
eMbRY-RiDDLE aERonaUticAl unIvERsiTy,600 S 
clYde MoRrIS BlVd,dAYTonA BEacH,Fl,32114. 
AAAAAaaaAaAAAAAAAAaaaaAaAAaAAaAAaa
AAaaAAAaaAAAaaAAAAaAaaaAAAAAAaAaA 
For this example, we assumed that the case mask is 
unchanged over the lifetime of the aircraft. But, it is 
also possible that this element could be implemented in 
such a manner to provide a rotating, time-based case 
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mask to prevent against further tampering, brute-force, 
or replay attacks. 
3.3. Encryption 
Our secondary goal was to determine if there was an 
effective solution for encrypting all ADS-B links to 
provide additional confidentiality and privacy to 
participants, as well as to ensure some degree of 
message freshness and integrity checks. This proves 
much more difficult to implement, especially when 
considering the significant difference in space available 
to messages in the 1090ES and UAT links. Since UAT 
provides much more space and flexibility in its message 
format specification, most research efforts have 
oriented themselves around that link, almost completely 
ignoring the 1090ES link where such functionality 
would be much more desirable. Hence, we take a 
complementary approach and place emphasis on the 
more-constrained 1090ES link as our discussion can 
easily be extended to UAT. We also assume that any 
encrypted data links will implement crossover support 
via ADS-R for encrypted 1090ES traffic to see 
encrypted UAT traffic, and vice versa. 
Bandwidth and resource limitations do not leave 
much room to utilize asymmetric encryption for 
encrypting ADS-B traffic. Therefore, symmetric 
encryption method with format-preserving properties is 
considered the best approach right now [17]. 
Researchers at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
determined that an encryption method named FFX-A2 
[4] (for which NIST standardization is still pending) 
would provide sufficient entropy for the ADS-B 
1090ES system, despite the number of fixed bits for any 
individual aircraft and its short message length [18]. 
However, this study left the issue of key distribution 
largely untouched, merely assuming that a CPDLC data 
link would serve the needs of key distribution for all 
aircraft [18]. 
While the CPDLC data link is certainly a viable 
option for key distribution, not all aircraft are 
configured with the necessary equipment to solely rely 
on this type of en route communication data link. We 
will describe an alternative that balances link 
encryption with data openness. Note that our previous 
approach for aircraft anonymization is fully 
interoperable with this idea. 
A request to operate under encrypted ADS-B 
conditions must be approved by the FAA, and should 
be carried out in a manner almost identical to the 
process for securely carrying out authenticated requests 
between the aircraft and FAA systems described earlier. 
The request type must be differentiated and additional 
payload parameters would be required. A two-step 
process is need to obtain the keys required to participate 
in the encrypted link. 
The aircraft performs the first step before taxi 
clearance is given, and is meant to obtain pre-clearance 
approval from the FAA to participate in the encrypted 
link. In addition to all parameters transmitted with an 
FAA request from above for aircraft anonymization in 
Step 2, the request for access to the encrypted data link 
would also include information about the flight path 
and any alternative routes identified due to forecasted 
weather along the route. Even if an aircraft encryption 
request is approved, no keys will be issued now. The 
concern is that somebody might try to gain access to 
encrypted transmissions by stating their intent to 
participate and receiving their key schedule for the 
route, but then not take off. So, there needs to be 
verification that the aircraft has indeed taken-off before 
the keys are transmitted to the aircraft. 
The second step is key distribution, and this might 
be handled in one of two ways depending on the airport 
from which an aircraft is taking off. If departing from a 
controlled airport, the keys can be securely transmitted 
over the encrypted communication link between the 
FAA systems and the aircraft upon delivery of takeoff 
clearance or roll. However if departing from an 
uncontrolled airport, the keys can be transmitted to the 
aircraft over the same link upon confirmation of radar 
contact or successful ADS-B signal multilateration 
from a nearby ATC, Air Route Traffic Control Centers  
(ARTCC), or ground facility (within no more than 10 
minutes after takeoff). We assume that if an aircraft 
takes off without successfully obtaining a key schedule, 
it must either deviate from its flight plan to achieve 
connectivity with the FAA systems or simply continue 
its flight in an unencrypted ADS-B mode. 
The NAS is divided into several zones, named 
ARTCC, which are meant to handle all aircraft en route 
through a given geographical region. A map of the US 
with these zones depicted can be seen at [14]. 
We propose a system whereby each ARTCC zone 
maintains its own encrypted ADS-B network of air and 
ground participants, as inspired by concepts presented 
in [17] and [25]. Each ARTCC zone will impose a 
universal zone symmetric encryption key KZ,T on its 
ground stations for zone Z and time period T, which 
will change every hour. The rotation of this universal 
zone key will prevent aircrafts from overstaying their 
presence in an encrypted link, as well as localize the 
extent to which key compromise can affect 
communications on the ADS-B link. This key, KZ,T, is 
distributed to all approved encrypted link participants at 
the time of the original request, whose reported route 
will cross into the zone for the specified time period. 
We assume that there is some mechanism by which 
these keys can be pre-determined and obtained by FAA 
systems for distribution in advance, such that aircraft 
will already have them onboard when needed. We will 
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also assume that these keys will be stored onboard the 
aircraft in such a manner that it is impractical to access 
by an attacker before their eventual expiration. 
In addition to this universal zone key, KZ,T, each 
zone will have a key used to encrypt all ADS-B traffic 
that changes every 15 minutes. This key is defined as 
KQ for that quarter Q of the hour. Ground stations in the 
zone shall continuously transmit this key every 5 
seconds in a specially marked ADS-B message that is 
encrypted by the current ARTCC zone key as follows: 
{KQ}Kz,t. Knowledge of the universal zone key KZ,T 
allows authorized ADS-B participants to obtain the 
correct key KQ.  
The authors of [18] proposed that the parity field of 
an ADS-B message also be encrypted for message 
integrity purposes; however, in the interest of 
maintaining backwards compatibility with older ADS-B 
transponders, our security framework does not observe 
this. 
Since the confidentiality of the encrypted ADS-B 
link depends on the secure transmission of the key KQ, 
we propose that KQ be constructed such that the 
integrity of the message source can be validated. In 
other words, we need to ensure that we are not 
receiving a spoofed encryption key announcement. Let 
us define the following operations: 
1. The ‘:’ (colon) character defines the concatenation 
operation. 
2. LEN(s) defines the function that returns the length 
(in bits) of parameter ‘s’. 
3. HMAC(x,y) defines the cryptographic hash function 
that calculates the MAC for ‘x’ in conjunction with 
secret key ‘y’. 
4. SN defines a binary data string of ‘n’-bits. 
We can then define KQ such that:  
           KQ = SN : HMAC(SN, KZ, T),  
                                   where LEN(KQ) = 80 bits. 
By using this approach to encryption, we would 
maintain the openness of ADS-B broadcast data within 
the encrypted link. It also ensures aircraft are bounded 
upwards of 1 hour, during which they could potentially 
still overhear any encrypted communications in that 
area. The selection of these time frames was arbitrary, 
and further modification of these time parameters could 
be performed to balance system performance with 
limiting access control, based on experimental testing 
or simulation. 
One could argue that a known plaintext attack is 
possible in this network configuration. While it is 
theoretically possible that an attacker could modify an 
aircraft to obtain the ADS-B message contents prior to 
encryption and then use a portable receiver to collect 
the network traffic, it will prove difficult to correlate an 
encrypted message to an aircraft since the aircraft 
identifier field is also encrypted. Even if someone 
managed to figure out the pairing between plaintext and 
ciphertext in the ADS-B traffic, it would still be 
infeasible to perform the attack in the amount of time 
needed to manipulate communications. If we assume 
that some machine onboard the aircraft can generate 
1018 ciphertexts each second and that the encryption 
key is 80-bits, it would take nearly 7 days to get a 
useful result. It is far more likely that improper 
handling of the secure communication channel with the 
FAA would be the weakest link to attack before the 
brute-force approach becomes feasible. 
A challenge with the proposed encryption approach 
is if an aircraft encounters unexpected weather, 
emergency, or delays along the flight path. For aircraft 
with available en route communication links, the reason 
for delay can be recorded and updated keys could be 
issued to extend access to an ARTCC zone or to allow 
entry into additional zones. As an alternative for those 
aircraft without the necessary hardware, it might be 
possible to declare any possible delays or deviations in 
addition to the intended flight plan, so that these keys 
are issued at takeoff as well. Obviously, this is less 
desirable from a security standpoint, but it would be 
more practical than forcing these participants to lower 
altitudes or to even land at an airport to establish a new 
communication channel. 
We expect that the implementation of encryption on 
top of the existing ADS-B specification will require 
some means of differentiating messages transmitted 
from aircraft operating under these conditions. This 
would be especially true if encrypted and unencrypted 
ADS-B links are operated simultaneously with one 
another, which is a reasonable assumption given the 
phased introduction of aviation technologies in the past. 
Encryption will obfuscate the content in the aircraft 
address and payload fields, resulting in content that 
might not make sense when processed by an aircraft 
without encryption capabilities. Therefore, there must 
be an easy way for the aircraft to differentiate between 
these categories of messages within the same ADS-B 
link. 
Looking at the breakdown of 1090ES message 
fields in Table 1, the downlink format (DF) and Mode S 
transponder capabilities (CA) fields are the most likely 
candidates for this purpose. Upon review of DO-181E, 
it became quickly apparent that repurposing the CA 
field bits would interfere with our intent to maintain 
backwards compatibility with TCAS [33]. However, the 
specification also indicated that of the 25 allocated 
downlink format numbers, only 12 have been officially 
provisioned and 13 are still available for alternative 
purposes [33]. 1090ES ADS-B currently utilizes two 
downlink formats: 17 (airborne participants) and 18 
(ground participants) [31]. An additional two downlink 
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formats can be drawn from this pool of available 
numbers to distinguish encrypted messages from 
unencrypted ones, while still using the same underlying 
message format specification. 
This is the most desirable solution for this problem, 
as it will require no software upgrade to those aircraft 
that do not intend to participate in encrypted data links. 
Their equipment will simply see the new downlink 
format and ignore it, because the format was not 
provisioned in the DO-181 specification version used at 
that time to write the software. However, this does 
mean that while all aircraft participating in an encrypted 
link will be able to see the unencrypted transmissions, 
the reverse will not necessarily be true. Future 
investigation will be required in this area to see if that 
gap could be bridged without giving the illusion that 
there are twice as many aircraft in the sky as compared 
to the actual airspace.  
There is another potential problem with the 
encryption method discussed above when operating 
near ARTCC zone boundaries. Specifically, an aircraft 
encrypts its ADS-B transmissions using the encryption 
key for the zone that it is currently flying over. 
However, if another aircraft across the border of a zone 
received that message, it would not be able to know 
which encryption key to use to process the contents. 
This degrades the integrity and quality of information 
received over an encrypted data link in this scenario, 
and represents another area of future research to see if a 
solution might be devised. For instance, if the capability 
field in the 1090ES message could be repurposed, 
aircraft could use graph coloring of ARTCC regions in 
the US to encode which zone’s encryption key was 
used to encrypt the message in conjunction with the 
aircraft’s current location.  
4. Conclusion 
At the onset of this work, we sought to develop 
effective and practical solutions to the issues of privacy 
and security within the ADS-B protocol. In addition to 
this, we also sought to minimize the number of changes 
required to the specification itself in order to maximize 
the number of aircraft that will be capable of taking 
advantage of the benefits provided by these proposed 
improvements. It remains to be a challenge to come up 
with a solution that would balance between addressing 
the relevant issues.  
We proposed an ADS-B security framework 
composed of two solutions. The first solution dealt with 
the issue of anonymity. The solution outlined a process 
whereby the identity of the operator requesting a 
temporary aircraft code could be verified, and how 
these codes could be provisioned and managed by civil 
aviation authorities to offer operators environmental 
and proximal privacy, while maintaining the ability of 
controllers and agencies to positively identify these 
aircraft while en route. The previous research efforts 
that offer anonymity in using ADS-B have focused on 
devising their solutions for UAT, which provides much 
more space and flexibility in its message format 
specification. Because any proposed solution needs to 
work for both UAT and 1090ES, we devised our 
solution for the more constrained 1090ES link. Our 
solution easily extends to UAT.  
The second solution dealt with the issue of 
encrypting the ADS-B data link. The solution described 
a method of separating the NAS into individual 
encrypted regions that coincide with existing ARTCC 
areas, and managing key distribution in each of these 
zones to maintain the principle of ADS-B situational 
openness between encrypted participants.  
It is yet to be determined whether the security 
framework outlined within this paper is the “best” 
approach for addressing anonymity and encryption 
issues in ADS-B. Further analysis and auditing of the 
underlying methods and processes are required.  
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